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Abstract
Product adoption is an important topic from the marketing perspective. People want to
understand how a new product penetrates a market. Researchers propose many models to
capture product adoption growth as well as the decision-making process for individuals. In
this work, we identify the lack of consideration in current research of how much time people
spend on their friends and families. We develop a new game-theoretical framework to model
how people spend their time. Also, we analyze the extreme cases in this model. In addition,
we do extensive simulations to understand the average case performance of the steady state.
We find that our resource allocation model is a potential game and the efficiency of the
steady state of the game is very good on average.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
In this work, we study product adoption. Product adoption is an important topic. It helps
new companies to develop strategies to penetrate markets. It also helps existing companies
to understand how to hold their market shares. The topic is very challenging by its nature. It
is intrinsically hard to capture how people make their decisions and how individual decisions
affect aggregate outcomes.
Marketing researchers, economists, and computer science people have done an extensive
amount of research in this regard. Marketing researchers develop different population models
to analyze the curve adoption growth and product life-cycle [2, 17, 21]. Economists and
computer scientists take a bottom-up approach. They designed network models and use
a game theoretical framework to capture strategic behavior at the individual level. They
analyze aggregate outcomes and the network effects on these outcomes [1, 4, 19, 12].
The main focus of this work is the resource allocation in the context of product adoption.
We focus on those products with strong network effects. Examples are online social networks
like Facebook and Google+. The traditional approach in analyzing network effects do not
consider the fact that people have limited time to spend on these products, and the time
constraints do affect the benefit of using different products. We identify the lack of research
on this topic and propose a game theoretical framework to understand resource allocation.
By understand how people allocate their resources, we know how efficient are people in
terms of using their time to work with others. From the theoretical perspective, it is hard
in general to coordinate the whole network and the result can be bad, players in games
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may use time very inefficiently. But surprisingly, in our simulation, people use their time
very efficiently. One can also use our model to analyze product adoption as well as general
coordination game on networks.
Our contributions are:
• Propose a new framework for technology adoption with limited resources.
• Develop a new model for resource allocation.
• Prove that our resource allocation game is a potential game and always admits at least
one Nash equilibrium.
• Study the best and the worst Nash equilibrium in resource allocation game.
• Do extensive simulations to analyze the average quality of Nash equilibrium in resource
allocation game.
The rest of the work is organized as follows: we introduce related work in the second
chapter. And we discuss models in the Chapter 3. We discuss theoretical results and
simulation results in Chapter 4. And we conclude our work in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we discuss related work regarding product adoption. We mainly discuss
two approaches: population model and network model. In population models, people study
product adoption from a global perspective. They try to characterize the adoption process
by looking at the effect of the total number of adoptions on the adoption rate. In network
models, researchers take a different approach. They first model the decision process of
individuals and then look at the effect of individual adoption on aggregate outcomes.
In addition to the product adoptions, we also look at behavioral models. Behavioral
models generalize product adoptions. One can think of product adoptions as a special case in
behavioral models with binary action space. We introduce some works regarding behavioral
models with binary action space. These works focus on the steady state. For example, if
people can choose between two products, what will they choose in the long run. These works
will offer us more insights into how to capture the steady state of product adoption.
And we also discuss behavioral models with continuous action space. Throughout our re-
search, we found that product adoption is very relevant to how people allocate their resources.
Therefore, we discuss some works in this vein. These works show us how to characterize the
steady state when the action space is continuous.
We introduce some works in influence maximization in the end. These works illustrate
how to use network effects to maximize the number of product adoptions. A classic problem
in this regard is: given a network and limited budgets, how do we maximize product adop-
tions by sending free samples to some users in the network. Computer science people have
3
done extensive research in this vein and we will introduce both the theoretical model as well
as popular algorithms.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We introduce population models in the
first section. And then we discuss network models in the second section. In the third and
fourth section, we focus on behavioral models with binary and continuous action space. And
we end the chapter by introducing works in influence maximization.
2.1 PRODUCT ADOPTION: POPULATION MOD-
ELS
Population models study behavior from a global point of view. They try to capture collective
behaviors and do not model strategic behaviors at the individual level.
Peres, Muller, and Mahajan grouped the research in population models into six cate-
gories: (1) the drivers for the growth of product adoption (2) the shape of adoption curves
(3) the effect of individual adoptions to aggregate behaviors (4) marketing multiple products
(5) cross-country influence, (6) the effect of competition on growth [21]. Due to the large
volume of works in this area, we focus only on Bass model. See [17, 21] for detail surveys in
population models.
Bass model [2] is the best-known model in this vein and many following works are based
on this model. Bass developed a theoretical model to capture the growth of adoption of a
new product. He also did an extensive analysis to compare the model with the real world
data and showed that the model is able to capture the trend of real world data.
Bass assumed that the adoption rate at a time is bilinear to the number of previous
adopters as well as the number of non-adopters. More specifically, they consider a monopoly
market and a new product A. They want to analyze the fraction of adopters in the market
at time T . Let f(T ) be the fraction of adopters of A at time T . Bass claimed that
df(t)
ddt
= p (1− f(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-adopters
+q f(t)︸︷︷︸
adopters
(1− f(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-adopters
(2.1)
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Here, p represents external influences and q represents internal influences. An example
for external influence is the advertisement of the product. And an example for internal
influence is the influence or pressure of adopters on non-adopters. The close form solution
for the differential equation is
f(t) =
1− exp(−(p+ q)t)
1 + ( q
p
) exp(−(p+ q)t) (2.2)
The contribution of this work is that it is the first theoretical model the accurately cap-
tures growth curves of products adoption and explains the underlying behavioral rationale.
Many works use Bass model to analyze the diffusion patterns of different products. For ex-
ample, Kobrin studied the pattern of oil production [kobrin:95] and Gatignon, Eliashberg,
and Robertson extended Bass models to estimate cross-country diffusion process and analyze
six different products like dishwashers and car radios [9].
2.2 PRODUCT ADOPTION: NETWORK MODELS
Network models study product adoption from the individual perspective. Unlike population
models, network models capture strategic behaviors at the individual level.
In this section, we first introduce how researchers use game theory to capture individ-
ual decision-making process, and then discuss two papers. Morris designed a game-theoretic
framework to analyze product adoption. And Immorlica et al. discussed the role of compat-
ibility in technology adoption.
2.2.1 GAME THEORY BACKGROUNDS
Economists use game theory to understand how people make decisions and how these deci-
sions affect others. And coordination game is the main tool researchers use to capture the
relationship between network effects and individual decision.
In a coordination game, people have two choices: A and B. One can think of A as
adopting a product, and choice B as not adopting a product. A person receives payoff
through an interaction if the person is able to coordinate with the other side of the interaction.
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Given an edge represents the interaction between two people, we can use a matrix Table 2.1
to represent how much a person will receive in different configurations. We call two people
‘row player’ and ‘column player’ respectively. In Table 2.1, the first row represents the
options for column player, and the first column represents the options for row player. The
cells containing tuples represents how much each player receives. For example, if both players
take action A, they will both receive qA.
One important topic here is how people choose strategies. We use the term solution profile
to describe the decisions of all the players. An important tool to characterize how people
make their choices is Nash equilibrium. Nash et al. defined the notion of Nash equilibrium.
A Nash equilibrium is a solution profile that, if any player deviates from their strategy in
that solution profile, her payoff will decrease. Because if people act rationally, they will not
make such deviation, Nash equilibrium is a stable state.
To apply coordination game in the analysis of product adoption, we have to first discuss
coordination games on networks. Coordination games on networks are a set of coordination
games on each edge of a network. People try to coordinate with all their neighbors to
maximize their payoff. The best outcome from the global perspective is that all people
coordinate on the same action, either A or B. But such goal is hard in general and it may
happen that two actions coexist in a game.
A B
A (qA, qA) (0, 0)
B (0, 0) (qB, qB)
Table 2.1: Example of a payoff matrix
Through social links, people affect each other through their own actions. Researchers
call such phenomenon ‘contagion’, ‘diffusion of behaviors’, or ‘word-of-mouth effect’.
2.2.2 CONTAGION
Morris characterized the conditions for contagion to occur [19]. Contagion is an outcome of
network effects. Through social links, product adopters will influence surrounding families
and friends. If the influence signals are strong enough, more people will adopt the prod-
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uct and cause the diffusion of adoption. Contagion refers to the state in which the whole
population adopts a new product.
Morris developed a model to capture how people affect each other on their choice of
product adoption in networks. In his game, there are two options: to adopt a new product
(A) or use an existing product (B). He assumes that A is superior to B so qA > qB. The
whole game starts with all people in the network adopting the inferior option B. And the
question Morris tries to ask is: if I pick a set of players and force them to use the other option
A, is it possible for all the population to adopt A because these players switch their actions?
He calls such phenomenon ‘contagion’. And if contagion is possible, can we characterize
contagion by the network structure? Contagion effect is so interesting because Morris points
out that even A is superior to B, it can still happen that people are not switching to A.
Instead of looking at simple graph properties like degree and number of players, Morris
proposed another feature ‘cohesion’. Given a set of players X, cohesion measure how con-
nected are the people in the set X. More specifically, if all the players in X have at least
proportion p of their connections within X, we say the group is p-cohesive.
Intuitively, a group that is p-cohesive with high p is tightly connected. The concept is
important because a p-cohesive group can stop the contagion. More specifically, in a game
with a group X that is p-cohesive, if we pick a set of players Y with no overlap with X and
make players in Y switch to A. Then to influence people in X, qA needs to be high to offer
strong incentives for people in X because people in X have more connections within the
group so they receive high payoff by staying at B.
Morris characterized the game with this cohesion property. He pointed out that contagion
occurs if qA is high enough so there is no group that is (1 − qA)-cohesive or higher. The
strength of his work is that he was able to determine the conditions for contagion to occur
in a robust yet elegant way. The major weakness of his work is that it is hard in general to
check if a graph has a (1− qA)-cohesive subgraph. And also, the model is rather simple and
fail to provide explanations for the case when we have more complicated action space. We
also do not know what happens when the payoff matrix is not diagonal or not symmetric.
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2.2.3 THE ROLE OF COMPATIBILITY
Morris motivated Immorlica et al. to understand the role of compatibility in the diffusion of
adoptions.
Immorlica et al. extended Morris’ work by adding compatibility option and compatibility
cost. More specifically, the strategy space in this game consists of three options: a new
product A, an existing product B, and both product A and B. People can choose to either
adopt one product or adopt both. But to adopt both products, they have to pay an extra
cost compatibility cost c. Without loss of generality, we say A is the superior product, which
gives qA > qB. The benefit for people using both products is that they are able to interact
with anyone. They can use product B to interact with people adopting product B and use A
to interact with who adopts A. The more interesting case is when they interact with people
using both products. Because players are rational in game theory, they will both choose
to use A and receive qA. We can use a similar payoff matrix to Table 2.1 to represent this
scenario. We present the payoff matrix here in Table 2.2.
A B AB
A (qA, qA) (0, 0) (qA, qA − c)
B (0, 0) (qB, qB) (qB, qB − c)
AB (qA − c, qA) (qB − c, qB) (qA − c, qA − c)
Table 2.2: Payoff matrix for coordination game with compatibility cost.
In their game, all players adopt product B in the beginning, which is the same as the
setting in Morris’ game. Immorlica et al. discovered that the compatibility cost affects conta-
gion in a non-convex way [12]. They draw the contagion region, the two dimensions are the
quality of product A and the compatibility cost. The contagion region is not convex. More
specifically, when the compatibility cost is higher than a threshold, if qA > qB, contagion
will occur. But they find that there is a range of cost such that qA has to be even bigger
to make contagion happen. This implies that inferior product may be able to hold market
share if they manage to provide compatibility to their customers with low cost.
In addition to characterize the contagion region, Immorlica et al. characterized a blocking
structure. That is, if such structure exists in the network, the contagion cannot happen and
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both products will exist in the game. The p-cohesive group in [19] is an example of such
block structure.
The strength of their work is their discovery of the role of the compatibility cost, as well
as their extension of the concept of cohesion and characterize blocking structures. The main
weakness is that their analysis heavily relies on d-regular graph. It is not clear if one can
extend the same argument to a game with more general network structure.
Morris and Immorlica et al. both analyzed coordination game with binary action space
on networks. Their work offer insights into why an inferior product may survive, and how
the network structure affects this. But their analyses are still restrictive and it is not easy
to extend their arguments to arbitrary graph or other strategy space.
2.3 OTHER BEHAVIORAL MODELS
In this section, we introduce some other behavioral models. Behavioral models capture how
people choose their behavior. And one can think of product adoption as a special case in the
behavioral model with binary action space. It is important to understand behavioral models
because it offers insights into how to model different decision process and capture different
elements.
The rest of the section is organized as follows. We first discuss the behavioral models
using binary action space. And we introduce models with continuous action space.
2.3.1 BINARY ACTION SPACE
Behavioral models with binary action space capture many aspects of network effects on the
decision-making process. For example, how people choose between two products.
We have discussed two works in this vein [19, 12]. Morris and Immorlica et al. analyzed
games in a deterministic approach. Players in their games do best-response deterministically.
But people in the real world does not always act rationally. Economists use the phrase
‘bounded rationality’ to describe this fact.
So here, we introduce two works that try to capture ‘bounded rationality’. They add
randomness when people are making decisions. They found that randomness makes it easier
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to analyze game dynamics and also illustrates how the whole population select between
equilibria.
Kandori, Mailath, and Rob studied coordination games with mutation setting [13]. The
basic game setting is the same as Morris’ games. The extra feature is the mutation setting.
With mutation setting, any player can change her strategy with a probability p. A direct
result is that, in this game, all possible outcomes can happen. The problem becomes which
outcome is more likely to happen than the others, or which outcome happens more often
than the others in the long run.
Let q be the threshold fraction such that if there are more than proportion q of a player
i’s neighbors choosing strategy A, i will choose A. Kandori, Mailath, and Rob proved that
if p is small and q is not too close to
1
2
, people choose the risk-dominant equilibrium with
high probability.
To be clear, in coordination game, if there are more than one equilibria N1, N2, · · ·NN ,
the risk-dominant equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium that if any player deviates from her
choice in the equilibrium, many players will suffer a huge decrease in payoff. Harsanyi, Selten,
et al. proposed this solution concept to solve the problem that Nash equilibrium is not unique
and we do not know how people choose between Nash equilibrium.
Kandori, Mailath, and Rob analyzed the outcome of considering bounded rationality.
And also, he justified that people will choose risk-dominant equilibrium in games on networks.
But one weakness of their work is that the interaction model in their game is global. One can
think of it as a game played on a complete network. Such interaction model is not realistic
because in real-world, no person interacts with all people in a social network. Another
problem with their argument of people choosing risk-dominant equilibrium more often than
the others is the mutation probability. Ellison showed that the time span of the ‘long-run’
depends on p. If p is small, it actually takes a long time before the population shift from
one equilibrium to the other. And such long time is not practical in practice.
Ellison refined the model and propose a local interaction model [8]. One can think of
it as a game played on an incomplete network. Ellison discovered that in local interaction
model, the shift from one equilibrium to the other takes much less time, which in turns
justify the observation that people choose one equilibrium more often than the others. The
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major contribution of their work is that they refine the interaction model and also justify
that risk-dominant equilibrium is indeed preferable. Moreover, Ellison showed that network
structure does not affect the timespan for shifting from one equilibrium to another.
The major weakness of the work is, still, the underlying graph structure. Although they
introduce local interaction notion and study an incomplete network. They still assume that
every player interacts with k other players. So we can think of it as a game played on
k-regular graph.
2.3.2 CONTINUOUS ACTION SPACE
We discussed different models in games with binary action space. Another line of works is the
models with continuous action space. Continuous action space capture aspects lack in binary
action space. For example, if we want to analyze how people allocate their time among their
friends, the action space will be continuous. The challenge here is how to capture the game
dynamics when the action space is continuous. And also, how to identify the role of network
structure in such game settings.
Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou studied a game with continuous action space and
quadratic utility function [1]. They focus on actions that are strategic substitutes. In their
game, players spend the effort to earn utility. And their payoff depends both on their utility
as well as the effort spends on others. They propose the following utility function.
Ui(x1, · · · , xn) = αxi + 1
2
σiix
2
i +
∑
j 6=i
σijxixj (2.3)
That is, the utility of player i is quadratic to its own effort xi, and linear to his friends’
efforts xj, j 6= i. Notice that the σij terms represent the neighborhood relationship in the
sense that if σij = 0, we can say that there is no connection between i and j. We can use one
σ matrix that contains all σij to characterize such game and network structure. Ballester,
Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou proved that [1], with some conditions, there exists only one
Nash equilibrium. And they use Bonacich centrality [3] to characterize the unique Nash
equilibrium. They also study the key-player problem: given a game, how can one find the
most valuable player in the network such that by removing this key player, one can reduce
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the aggregated effort of the whole population.
The strength of their work is the novel construction of the game, they use one matrix
to capture both of the utility function and the graph structure. And also, they identify
the role of network structure in this game. They use results from spectral graph theory to
characterize the unique Nash equilibrium. They also provide extensive examples on how
to apply their theorems in the real world. Examples are crime networks and collaboration
networks.
The main weakness of their work is that they study specific quadratic utility functions.
The function nicely captures linear externalities in players actions but its restricted. Bramoulle´,
Kranton, and D’amours generalized Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou’s games as well
as others and provide a unified analysis [4].
Bramoulle´, Kranton, and D’amours generalized this model and studied all possible strate-
gic interaction. Close to the setting of the previous work, their game consists of a set of
players as well as an underlying graph G representing the relationship between players. They
examine all utility functions of the form:
Ui(xi,x−i; δ,G)
with best response:
fi(x−i), δ,G) = max
(
0, ci − δ
n∑
i=1
gijxj
)
Where δ is the parameter that represents the degree of substitutability: how does an action
of one player substitutes for the other players actions. Bramoulle´, Kranton, and D’amours
discovered that the lowest eigenvalue characterize the existence of stable Nash equilibrium.
More precisely, by examining the potential function, they realize that the smallest eigenvalue
λmin(G) of the graph G plays an important role in determining uniqueness Nash equilibrium.
And also, they discover that λmin measures how the network G amplifies the substitutability.
Their conclusion is that if
λmin(G) <
1
δ
(2.4)
, then there is only one Nash equilibrium. In other cases, there may be more than one
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Nash equilibrium. The use perturbation analysis of quadratic programming to analyze the
stability of Nash equilibrium. They find that the unique Nash equilibrium maximizing
potential function value is stable when Eq. (2.4) is satisfied. More generally, given a Nash
equilibrium S, let A be the set of active agents and let GA be the subgraph consisting of
active agents, they realize that λmin(GA) <
1
δ
implies the stability of S. And they also point
out that many stable Nash equilibria have inactive agents(free riders).
The strength of their work is that they are able to characterize Nash equilibrium for
a wide range of games. They develop methods to connect the network structure to Nash
equilibrium through the help of spectral graph theory. Moreover, they identify that the
direction of previous works, which mainly focused on symmetric equilibria, is wrong. They
also provide extensive analysis on many real-world cases like crime networks and social
networks.
The weaknesses of their works are as follows. First of all, in these models, action space
is R. This means that they can only model the case where people have only one action to
interact with all other players. But in reality, we also need to model the case that people have
different strategies for different friends. Secondly, many existing works assume that given a
player i, all its neighbors affect i in the same way. However, people do have preferences on
their neighbors. Thirdly, they assume linear externality, and the connection to graph theory
heavily rely on the linearity. It will be interesting to examine more complicated externality
functions.
2.3.3 MORE ON NETWORK EFFECTS
One interesting topic in product adoption is how to use network effects to maximize product
adoption rate? For example, if a company wants to promote their products, one approach
is to persuade some people in the social network to use their products by giving them
free samples. Through the social influence, they may influence their neighbors and cause
contagion. The major challenge here is that dynamics on networks are hard to capture. And
it is hard to choose the set of players to give free samples with limiting budget.
Domingos and Richardson first studied this topic [7, 22]. They study the network value
of a user. In target marketing, firms analyze the behaviors of users to decide who may
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be a potential customer and then promote their products to these users. However, many
traditional works focus more on analyzing and mining historical data of a user but ignore
the network effect of that user. In reality, friends behavior may strongly affect a person’s
decision. Viral marketing, which makes use of this word-of-mouth effect, can be very effec-
tive. Domingos and Richardson identified the lack of pricing such network effect in existing
approaches and use a graphical model to capture the social influence of players. They prove
the effectiveness by running experiments on a movie database and prove that their method
can find profitable (binary)marketing strategy. Richardson and Domingos extends their work
to continuous marketing strategy and apply such strategies to data from some knowledge-
sharing sites, such as the platform for customers to exchange information, writing product
reviews, etc.
Domingos and Richardson motivated Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos to develop the the-
oretical framework for influence maximization [14]. Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos attacked
the problem from theoretical approach and propose a game-theoretical model to capture the
diffusion process. Their main focus is: given a weighted network and a budget, how to max-
imize the influence of a product. Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos studied two popular diffu-
sion models: Linear Threshold (LT) model and Independent Cascading (IC) model. Kempe,
Kleinberg, and Tardos proved the influence maximization problem is NP-hard. But they
examine the influence spread function σ(S), which is the function that returns the coverage
of diffusion given a set of nodes S. And they find that the influence spread functions σ(S) is
monotone and submodular. This property helps them develop an approximation algorithm
with the approximation ratio of 1− 1
e
.
The weakness of the algorithm is the scalability. Chen, Wang, and Yang showed that
influence spread of a set of nodes is #p-hard [6], so Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos had to
find a way around the computation issue. They propose to do Monte Carlo simulations
10,000 times to approximate the value. Such simulation is inefficient and cannot scale to a
massive network. To solve this problem, many people propose different approaches, examples
are: CELF [16], CELF++ proposed by [10], and MIP [6, 5].
Leskovec et al. proposed CELF to optimize the greedy algorithm by exploiting the sub-
modularity of influence spread [16]. Let marginal gain of influence spread by adding a node
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u be ∆u(S) = σ(S ∪ {u}) − σ(S). Leskovec et al. sort all the nodes based on the marginal
gain. Because the marginal gain always goes down, they can update those nodes with higher
marginal gain and save significant time by reducing the total number of simulations in each
round. Goyal, Lu, and Lakshmanan proposed CELF+ to refine this idea [10]. They observe
that in one round if the node with highest marginal gain is the same as the last round, we do
not have to recompute the marginal gain. This observation leads to 17− 61% improvement.
Chen, Wang, and Yang proposed another approach to maximize influence [6, 5]. They
first discover that computing influence spared in independent cascade(IC) model is #p-
hard in general. They propose another model: Maximum Influence Arborescence(MIA) to
approximate IC model. The idea of MIA is to constraint influence propagates through the
path with the highest probability. For example, given two nodes u and v, they restrict the
only way u can influence v is through a path pu∼v such that the probability of that path is
the highest among all possible paths {p′u∼v}. With this more structured model, they develop
a much more efficient approximation algorithms to maximize influence in this MIA model.
There are an extensive amount of works in this vein. We know how to model influence
maximization problem, and are able to use approximation algorithm to select a set of nodes
to achieve our goals. See [23] for more details of influence maximization algorithms.
15
Chapter 3
MODELS AND DEFINITIONS
We discussed many games on networks. These works emphasize the importance of local
interactions or social ties. But they do not look deeper into the local interaction model. There
are two major weaknesses that motivate our work. First, they do not capture preferences
of players. Second, they do not consider the number of times people interact with each
other. Third, the do not consider the resource constraint. People do not have infinite time
to interact with all their friends and families.
The preferences of people are important because this is how they value each social tie.
For example, people weight family higher than their friends. The number of times people
interact with each other is also important because social influence comes from the fact that
people interact. And the amount of time they interact with each other change the value of
that social tie. The time constraint is important because it limits how people spend the time
among their friends. So we suggest capturing these three features.
In this section, we introduce the coordination games with limited resources. And because
of the complexity of the model, we focus on the resource distribution game, which is the
basis for coordination games with limited resources. And the coordination games with limited
resources is our future work.
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3.1 COORDINATION GAME WITH LIMITED RE-
SOURCE
The works of Morris [19] and Immorlica [12] motivate our work. Our game setting is close
to their games. Our game consists of N players P and an underlying graph G = (V,E).
Each node of the graph represents a player, and each edge represents a social link between
players. In the game, players interact with each other through technologies. And there are
two technologies: A and B. Players can choose between A and B, or choose to use A and B
at the same time. For simplicity, we denote the strategy of using A and B at the same time
as AB.
By using technology to interact with their friends, a player receives certain payoff. The
number times a player interacts with her friend decide the payoff she will receive from the
friend. And we also assume that they have limited time, which implies there is an upper
bound on the total number of interactions per user.
We define some notations. For simplicity, we use players and users interchangeably. For
a given graph G = (V,E), we use N(i) = {j|(i, j)} to deonte the neighborhood of player i.
We use N+(i) = N(i) ∪ {i} to denote the neighborhood of a player i and the player itself.
We denote deg(i) as the degree of a node i.
The graph is weighted and undirected. We associate each edge (i, j) with two rational
numbers wij and wji. The weight wij captures the preference of a player i on a player j and
the weight wji is the preference of j on i. We use these weights to compute utility, which we
will define in the next section. For simplicity, weights are all normalized, that is
∑
j∈N(i)
wij = 1 (3.1)
We also define wii = 0. So we also have
∑
j∈N+(i)
wij = 1 (3.2)
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Every player has some (limited) resource to interact with their neighbors. They receive
payoff through the interaction with others. Players can also earn payoff from participating
the game. For example, a player can still earn payoff by browsing contents in Instagram
even she does not interact with any friend at all. For simplicity, we do not consider this type
of payoff. We denote the resource of player i as βi.
Recall that players use technologies to interact with their friends, we use T to denote
the technology space {A,B,AB}. Consider both the time and the technology, the strategy
space consists of two parts: resource(time) allocation and technology choices.
The strategy space for time allocation is a N -dimensional vector, ~fi = (f1, f2, · · · , fn) ∈
RN , which represents the resource(time) a player i wants to spend on each player. Each
element in the vector takes value in [0, β]. Due to the resource constraint setting, we have
the following equality ∑
j
fij = βi (Resource Constraint)
Given the space for time allocation and technology choices, the strategy space of every
player is T × [0, β]N . An example for a strategy is (~fi, ti) where ti ∈ T .
Given the strategy space of each player, we denote the action of every player i as xi =
(~fi, ti).A solution profile is a set of actions used by every players x = {x1, x2, · · · , xn}. For
simplicity, we let x−i = {x1, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xn}. That is, x−i is a solution profile without
the action xi of player i.
We denote ui : (T × [0, β]N)N 7→ R as the utility function for player i. The input is
a solution profile and the output is a real number. In the next section, we will define the
utility function.
We discussed the settings for our games and now we discuss some notions in game theory
and how we represent them in our game setting. In game theory, given a solution profile,
the best response of a player i is the strategy that maximizes her payoff. We denote bi(x−i)
as the best response function and
bi(x−i) = arg max
xi∈T×[0,β]N
ui(xi,x−i) (3.3)
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A player may deviate from any given solution profile. We are interested in the stable
solution profile, which we call Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium) Given a game, a solution profile x is a Nash equilib-
rium if and only if for every player i,
ui(xi,x−i) ≥ ui(x′i,x−i)
The Nash equilibrium x is also a solution for the following set of equations
xi = bi(x−i) ∀i
In our game, there can be more than one Nash equilibria. We do not know which
equilibrium the population will choose in general, so we are interested in the worst case and
the best case. That is, how bad and how good this stable state can be. To evaluate the
quality of a Nash equilibrium, we define the social welfare of a game as the aggregation of
the players’ utilities:
Definition 2 (Social Welfare) Given a solution profile x, the social welfare of a game
(P ,G, β, T ) is the aggregation of all players utilities in that solution profile x. That is:
SW (x) =
∑
i∈P
ui(x) (3.4)
Let the solution profile maximizing the social welfare be OPT , we can then define two
popular efficiency metrics to evaluate a Nash equilibrium:
Definition 3 (Efficiency Metrics) Given a game (P ,G, β, T ), there is a solution profile
OPT maximizing social welfare value, a Nash equilibrium NEmax maximizing the social
welfare value, and a Nash equilibrium NEmin minimizing the social welfare value. The Price
of Anarchy(PoA) of the game is
PoA((P ,G, β, T )) = SW (OPT )
SW (NEmin)
(3.5)
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And similarly, the Price of Stability(PoS) of the game is
PoS((P ,G, β, T )) = SW (OPT )
SW (NEmin)
(3.6)
The PoA measures how bad the stable state can be in a game and the PoS measures how
good the stable state can be in a game.
The game setting for the coordination game with limited resources is complicated. The
strategy space of every player consists of a continuous action space and a discrete action
space. Also, we do not have tools to analyze the coordination game with continuous action
space in our setting. So we focus on a special case of our games: the game with one technology
only. Our goal is to understand how people distribute their time among their neighbors.
In the next section, we will first define resource distribution game. And then we will
introduce the utility function as well as the weighting system that is used in our work. We
then introduce a broad class of resource distribution game which we call uniform-weighting
resource distribution game that admits a potential function. We also explain the best re-
sponse dynamic as well as the convex programs based on best response dynamic. And at the
end of this section, we explain the importance of starting state in our game and introduce
proportional starting state.
3.2 RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION GAME
In this section, we define resource distribution game. And look deeper into the setting.
A resource distribution game is a specialized coordination game with limited resources.
It as a special case where there is only one technology available to players. The difference
between this game and general coordination game we discussed in the last section is the set
of technologies T . Because T has only one element in the current setting, we simplify the
notation and use (P ,G, β) to represent the game. And also, the utility function ui now maps
from [0, β]N to a real number.
For simplicity, we assume β-regularity for resources: every player has the same limited
resources β. We use min function to capture the coordination. That is, for every two
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(connected) players i and j, they will interact with each other with interaction frequency
min(fij, fji). We denote this frequency as f
∗
ij so
f ∗ij = min(fij, fji)
For clarity, we give the formal definition of resource distribution game as follows.
Definition 4 (Resource Distribution Game) A resource distribution game is a tuple
(P ,G, β) consists of a set of player P, an underlying graph G = (V,E,W ), and a real
number β.
The graph G represents a social network. The graph is undirected and weighted. Unless
otherwise specified, the graph should admit no multi-edge and no self-loop. Every node in the
graph represents a player, and every edge (i, j) in the graph represent a social link between
two players i and j. We associate two weights with each edge: wij and wji, each capture i
and js preference over the other respectively.
The action space for each player i is a vector ~fi ∈ [0, β]N . Each component of ~fi is fij,
which represents the proposal of player i to player j. Because the resource is limited, we have
N∑
j=1
fij =
∑
j∈N(i)
fij ≤ β ∀i ∈ P (3.7)
For simplicity, we define fii = β −
∑
j∈N(i). And define N+(i) = N(i) ∪ {i} In this way, we
can write ∑
j∈N+(i)
fij = β ∀i ∈ P (3.8)
For every two connected players i and j, we define f ∗ij = min(fij, fji) as the agreed value
of two player. We also use the phrse ‘effective frequency’ to describe f ∗ij. As we will see in
the later section, effective frequency decide the utility i receives from interaction with j.
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3.3 UTILITY FUNCTION AND WEIGHTING SYS-
TEM
In our game, people receive utility from interacting with others. There are two steps to
compute utility. Every player first computes the utility per interaction with a neighbor, and
then scale that utility by the interaction frequency she spends on the neighbor. The total
utility of each player is the summation of all the utilitie she receives from all her neighbors.
To compute the utility per interaction with a neighbor, we use weighting system. Recall
that weightings capture the preferences of players. Our approach is to scale the row utility
per interaction by the weight. For example, if a player i interacts one time with player j, let
the raw utility per interaction be uraw, the utility i receives for this interaction is wijuraw.
We can normalize this uraw for the whole graph and the utility of i interacts with a neighbor
j once is wij.
Determining the weight on graphs is interesting. Existing works in the research of con-
tagion and influence maximization does not tell how they decide the weights. We define a
global ranking to capture the social status in the real world. And based on that status, we
define the corresponding weighting.
Example 1 (Global-Ranking Weighting System) A global ranking is a function GR :
P 7→ Z+. By imposing this function on a game (P ,G, β), we can associate each player i with
a number W (i). Then in the global ranking weighting system, the weight wij of an edge (i, j)
in the graph G is defined as
wij =
W (j)∑
j∈N(i)W (i)
(3.9)
We can define the weighting system in other ways. But this global ranking weighting
system captures the notion of social status and it also guarantees a potential game.
Another part of utility is the total utility a player received from its neighbor. In general,
the utility function for a player i is ui(·). The utility player i gets from player j is uij :
R × R 7→ R. The function takes the proposals of both palyer i and player j as inputs.
The first theoretical result we have is, if the form of utility function is the symmetric for all
players, that is uij = uji ∀i 6= j, then the game is a potential game.
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Proposition 1 (Potential Game) Given a game (P ,G, β), if the game adopts global rank-
ing weighting system, and the utility functions are symmetric for all the players, then (P ,G, β)
is a potential game.
We will present the proof for Proposition 1 and the potential function in Section 4.1. To
end this section, we introduce one specific utility function that we will study later in this
work:
Example 2 (Quadrdatic Utility Function) Given a player i, let f ∗ij be the effective in-
teraction frequency for i’s interaction with j, the utility i receives is:
ui(j) = wijf
∗
ij(β − f ∗ij) (3.10)
As you can see, this is a quadratic function that maximizes when f ∗ij =
β
2
. This function
captures two important features of real-world interactions: First of all, the utility increases
sin the beginning when the interaction increases. Secondly, utility decreases after it reaches
some threshold. The threshold we have here is β
2
. From now on, unless otherwise specified,
we assume that the game is adopting Global ranking weighting system and this quadratic
utility function.
3.4 LOCAL AND GLOBAL INTERACTION
We can examine the game from two perspectives. From the local perspective, players are
trying to maximize their own utility, which leads to a convex program for local interaction.
From the global perspective, if we are a coordinator coordinating everything of the game,
one interesting question to ask is: can I make every player happy? One way to capture this
notion is to compute the social welfare of a game. To maximize this value, we have another
convex program for this global interaction.
As we will see in a later section, if a game takes global ranking weighting, then its PoS
is one, which means the quality of its Nash equilibrium can be good.
From the local perspective, the one-degree ego network centered on each player i in the
game forms a set of local interactions. In our game, we are using best-response dynamic,
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so the player i will want to maximize his payoff. There are two constraints: first of all, at
the time point player i is making his move, i knows all his neighbors’ proposals. Because i
will act rationally, it will not propose more than fji to its neighbor j. This leads to the first
constraint:
fij ≤ fji (3.11)
The second constraint is Eq. (3.8).
We call the quadratic program local convex program:
Definition 5 (Local Convex Program) For every player i, let N(i) be her neighborhood.
Use fij to denote her proposal to j, and fji is j’s proposal to i. i will want to solve a convex
program to maximize her own payoff, the convex program is the local convex program LC(i)
of player i, which is
min
~f
FL(~f) =
∑
j∈N+(i)
wijfij(fij − β)
s.t.fij ≤ fji ∀i ∈ P ∀j ∈ N(i)∑
j∈N+(i)
fij = β ∀i ∈ P
fij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ P ∀j ∈ N+(i)
(3.12)
Note that we do minimization here, but the objective function has opposite sign to the utility
function, so we are maximizing the utility.
After computing the local convex program, notice that fii represents the excess of in-
teraction frequency. That is, no mater how i spends fii, she cannot increase her payoff. It
is not clear what i will do. For clarity, we define two types of dynamics: aggressive and
conservative.
Definition 6 (Aggressive and Conservative Best-response) In a player i takes ag-
gressive best-response, she will first compute her local convex program. And then i will
spend fii on each edge proportionally. That is, for every neighbor j, let the frequency in the
solution of local convex program be fLij , we have
fij = f
L
ij + fii × wij
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If a player takes the conservative approach, then we say the player will store the frequency
fii and do not spend it on any edge.
We will show that no matter how players choose between these two dynamics, the game
is a potential game, and also, the price of stability can all be one.
From the global perspective, we want to maximize the social welfare (SW), which is the
total utility. To maximize the social welfare, we have the following convex program
Definition 7 (Global Convex Program) For a game (P ,∼, β). The global convex pro-
gram GC((P ,G, β)) of the game is a convex program trying to maximize the social welfare
function. There are two types of variables: ~f and ~f ∗. ~f is the proposal that players make.
For example fij is the proposal of player i to player j. And ~f
∗ is the agreed value between
two people. For example, f ∗ij = min(fij, fji). Same constraints in Definition 5 are imposed
here for every player i.
min
~f, ~f∗
FG(~f) =
∑
i∈P
∑
j∈N(i)
wijf
∗
ij(f
∗
ij − β)
s.t.f ∗ij ≤ fij ∀i ∈ P ∀j ∈ N(i)
f ∗ij = f
∗
ji ∀i ∈ P ∀j ∈ N(i)∑
j∈N(i)
fij = β ∀i ∈ P
f ∗ij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ P ∀j ∈ N(i)
(3.13)
Note that the objective function is the opposite of total utility. So the minimization is equiv-
alent to maximizing the total utility.
These are the two critical convex program in our game. One can observe from the
local convex program that the initial state is important. This is because we have the con-
straint Eq. (3.11), which implies that if in the beginning, if all the neighbors of i propose 0
to i, then i will not be able to propose anything and will not receive any utility. But in the
real world, this seldom helps. In the next section, we introduce proportional starting state
to solve this problem.
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3.5 PROPORTIONAL STARTING STATE
One observation of the real world is that people distribute their time according to their
preference in the beginning. For example, when you are working with your friends and some
acquaintances, very likely you will spend more time with your friends and then adjust the
distribution based on the result. To capture this, we propose proportional starting state:
the first proposals people make is proportional to their preferences.
Definition 8 (Proportional Starting State) In the beginning of the game (P ,G, β), ev-
ery player i will propose initial frequency to their friends with no history data. We call the
set of initial values of all players starting state. Proportional starting state strategy defines
that player i will propose wijβ to player j.
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Chapter 4
RESULTS
4.1 THEORETICAL RESULTS
We present three major theoretical results in this section. First, we present the potential
function for our game and prove that our game is a potential game. Based on this result,
we know that Nash equilibrium always exists in our game. The second and the third results
are the quality of Nash equilibria. We show that with bad initial frequency proposal, we can
have low-quality Nash equilibria. On the other hand, we also show that optimal solution for
the global convex problem is also a Nash equilibria. There is a significant difference between
PoS and PoA. In the next section, we present our simulations and show that, on average, a
game will converge to a Nash equilibria with good quality.
The following results are proved in the Appendix.
4.1.1 CHARACTERIZING POTENTIAL GAME
Given a game (P ,G, β) adopting global ranking weighting and symmetric utility function,
let NW (i) =
∑
j∈N(i)W (j). We define potential function U : x 7→ R as follows:
Φ(x) =
∑
i∈P
W (i)NW (i)
∑
j∈N(i)
wijuij (4.1)
The intuition of this potential function is two observations: First of all, because players
compute utility based on effective frequency. If a player change its proposed frequency and
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the effective frequency changed accordingly, the difference is the same for both the player
and the corresponding neighbor. Secondly, recall that wij =
W (i)
NW (i)
. By scaling the utility by
W (i)NW (i), we will have W (i)W (j) for every j ∈ N(i), and this is symmetric. Whenever
player i is making a rational move, the total value increases. See the detailed proof for the
potential function in Appendix A.
4.1.2 HOW GOOD AND HOW BAD CAN A NASH EQUILIB-
RIUM BE?
Because the potential value is given by this function always increases when any player makes
a rational move, we can prove Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 (Potential Game) Given a game (P ,G, β), if the game adopts global rank-
ing weighting system, and the utility functions are symmetric for all the players, then (P ,G, β)
is a potential game.
Notice that this result does not rely on the form of the utility function, nor does it rely
on the best-response dynamic used by players. If utility function is symmetric for all the
player, the game is a potential game.
Because a game with global ranking weighting system and symmetric utility function is
a potential game, it always admits at least one Nash equilibrium. The next question we
address is how bad and how god can its Nash equilibria be. It turns out that the Nash
equilibrium can be arbitrarily bad.
Theorem 1 The price of anarchy of a game (P ,G, β) adopting global-ranking weighting
scheme can be arbitrarily high.
Proof: Consider the game with players on a two-dimensional grid presented in Fig. 4.1.
In the game, every players in row k has rank αk. So given a player i in row k, she has
one neighbor in row k + 1, two neighbors in row k, and one neighbor in row k − 1. We
present two confiugrations in Fig. 4.1 that correspond to a Nash equilibrium with good
social welfare( Fig. 4.1a), and a Nash equilibrium with bad social welfare( Fig. 4.1b).
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Let the solution profile in Fig. 4.1a be NEgood and the other one be NEbad. First,
these two profiles are both Nash equilibria. The reason is because every player has reach
agreements. No player has extra frequency so based on the local convex program, nobody
will deviate from the solution profiles.
In Fig. 4.1a, every player will receive payoff
β2
4
(
α2 + 1
(α + 1)2
)
And in Fig. 4.1b, every player will receive payoff
β2
4
(
α
(α + 1)2
)
So if the game have N players, we have
SW (NEgood) = N × β
2
4
(
α2 + 1
(α + 1)2
)
and
SW (NEbad) = N × β
2
4
(
α
(α + 1)2
)
Let OPT be the solution profile that maximizes the social welfare, and let NEworst be
the Nash equilibrium that minimizes the social welfare, we have
PoA =
SW (OPT )
SW (NEworst)
≥ SW (NEgood)
SW (NEbad)
=
α2 + 1
2α
We can make this PoA arbitrarily big by tuning the parameter α. Notice that this result
does not depend on the size of the grid, so the game can have bad Nash equilibrium even
with a small number of players.
We now want to know how good a Nash equilibrium can be. The next theorem shows
that, if a game adopts quadratic utility function( 2), we can guarantee that optimal solution
is also a Nash equilibrium.
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(a) N.E. with high social welfare. (b) N.E. with low social welfare.
Figure 4.1: Example of game with bad PoA.
Theorem 2 (Stability of Optimal Solution) Given a game (P ,G, β) adopting global-
ranking weighting scheme and uniform utility function. If the utility function used by players
are all quadratic utility function (Example 2), then the optimal solution is also a Nash equi-
librium.
The detailed proof is left to Appendix B. And this leads to the next corollary.
Corollary 1 Given a game (P ,G, β) adopting global-ranking weighting scheme and quadratic
utility function, the price of stability is 1.
4.2 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
As we have seen in the last section, the gap between the price of anarchy and price of stability
is very large. One interesting topic is the average case performance in the real world In this
section, we look at average case performance by conducting experiments.
Our simulation consists of a regular graph with a thousand nodes. And they all have
limited resource β = 200. Unless otherwise specified, we adopt proportional starting state
and use global ranking weighting. We use quadratic utility function for all players. In the
following sections, we run simulation 80 times and compute the average and the standard
deviation of total utility. In order to make the stats more meaningful, we scale the total
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utility by the optimal utility of each game. We define average performance as
SW (Nash)
SW (OPT )
(4.2)
for each Nash equilibrium. This is exactly the inverse of the price of anarchy and it measures
how efficient a game is.
The results are organized in the following manner. We first present the average perfor-
mance for regular graphs with different degrees. And then compare games with the different
initial states. There are many initialization strategies that we can choose from: proportional,
quadratic proportional, etc. The third comparison is between different role distributions. Re-
call that we use global ranking weighting scheme. The global ranking captures the social
status in the real world. We are interested in how the role distributions in the population
can affect the efficiency. In the end of the section, we look at global ranking from another
perspective. In global-ranking weighting system, we compute weighting based on ranking
and normalization. There are many other ways to compute weighting: proportional to the
square of rank, exponential to the square of rank, etc.
4.2.1 REGULAR GRAPH OF DIFFERENT DEGREE
We do simulations on regular graphs with different degrees. The results are presented
in Fig. 4.2. The first observation is that for conservative strategy, the average performance
decreases as the degree of regular graph increases. But for the aggressive strategy, the aver-
age performance decreases in the beginning, but for the graphs with the degree more than 6,
the average performance increase. The second observation is that aggressive strategy takes
much more time than conservative strategy.
4.2.2 DIFFERENT STARTING STATES
There are many different ways to configure initial proposal for players in games. In the
previous sections, we have seen proportional starting states. There are two other interesting
starting states that we would like to discuss. Instead of distribution frequency based on the
weighting, we can also distribute frequency based on the square of weighting, which we called
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(a) Average performance. (b) Average steps.
Figure 4.2: Simulations for regular graphs with different degrees.
quadratic-proportional starting state. And also, we can distribute frequency based on the
exponential to the weighting, which we called exponential weighting. The formal definition
is as follows.
Example 3 (Different starting states.) Given a game adopting the global-ranking weight-
ing system, we have quadratic-proportional weighting system, which defines the initial pro-
posal for i to j as:
f quad−propij = β ×
w2ij∑
k∈N(i)w
2
ik
(4.3)
And we can also define exponential weighting in the similar way:
f expij = β ×
exp(wik)∑
j∈N(i) exp(wik)
(4.4)
The simulation results are presented in Fig. 4.3. We also include the results when some
players adopt proportional starting state and some adopt quadratic-proportional starting
state.
The first thing we observe is that the average performance degrades as the degree of
regular graph increases. As we can see in the figure, exponential starting state performs like
proportional starting state and perform really well. The average utility is around 90% of the
optimal total utility. On the other hand, the games adopting quadratic-proportional starting
state are not very efficient compared to other starting state. The mixture of proportional
starting state and quadratic-proportional starting locates in the between. The conclusion is
proportional starting state is a good strategy overall.
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(a) Aggressive best-response. (b) Conservative best-response.
Figure 4.3: Average performance of different initial proposals.
4.2.3 DIFFERENT ROLE DISTRIBUTIONS
There are many different ways to decide the global ranking and the roles. We analyze this
problem from a statistical perspective and interested in the following question. What kinds
of role distributions perform the best? We adopt uniform distribution as a baseline case, as
well as Gaussian distribution and power-law distribution. The later two distribution better
capture the fact that in the social network, there are lots of people who have similar social
status, but only a few people have very high or low social status. We show the results
in Fig. 4.4.
Our observation is that by using the normal distribution to distribute the roles, the
efficiency of a game can be as high as 96% in average for the aggressive case. And 93% for
the conservative case. On the other hand, games with power-law role distribution do not
perform well in average.
4.2.4 DIFFERENT WEIGHTING SCHEMES
We also compare different weighting schemes. Previously we discussed global-ranking weight-
ing, which is basically a proportional weighting scheme. There are two other interesting
weighting schemes: quadratic-proportional weighting and exponential weighting.
Example 4 (Different weighting systems) Given a game (P ,G, β) and a global ranking
GR, we can associate each player i with a rank W (i) = GR(i). Quadratic-proportional
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(a) Aggressive best-response. (b) Conservative best-response.
Figure 4.4: Average performance of different role distributions.
weighting defines wij as:
wij =
W 2(i)∑
j∈N(i)W
2(j)
(4.5)
And the exponential weighting defines wij as:
wij =
exp(W (i))∑
j∈N(i) exp(W (j))
(4.6)
The results are presented in Fig. 4.5. We can see that in general, average performance
is a lot better than other weighting schemes, both in the aggressive case and conservative
case.
(a) Aggressive best-response. (b) Conservative best-response.
Figure 4.5: Average performance of different weighting.
Throughout these simulations, we found that average efficiency for our game is high, both
in the case of using aggressive best-response and conservative best-response. And also, we
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found that games with aggressive best-response almost always have better efficiency than
the games with conservative best-response.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
In this work, we study product adoption with limited resources. We started from defining
the general framework for coordination games with limited resources. And because of the
complexity of the framework. We restricted our attention to a special case: the resource
distribution game on networks. We developed game theory model to capture how people
spend their resources on their friends.
Our contributions are:
• Propose a new framework for technology adoption with limited resources.
• Develop a new model for resource allocation.
• Prove that our resource allocation game is a potential game and always admits at least
one Nash equilibrium.
• Study the best and the worst Nash equilibrium in resource allocation game.
• Do extensive simulations to analyze the average quality of Nash equilibrium in resource
allocation game.
Our future work is to study coordination games on networks considering resource con-
straints. We expect to extend our results to coordination games and examine the properties
of contagion studied in [19] and [12]. We also want to analyze influence maximization prob-
lem in our framework and study existing algorithms for influence maximization.
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Another direction is community formation. If we consider a resource distribution game
on the complete network, then after the game reaches steady state, we can remove those
connections with low interaction frequency. An interesting topic is whether the resulting
network can reflect community formation in the real world.
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Appendix A
PROOF FOR POTENTIAL GAME
In this chapter, we discuss the proof for Proposition 1. Because the game adopts global-
ranking weighting scheme, every weight wij can be written as
wij =
W (j)∑
j∈N(i)W (i)
(3.9)
Recall the potential function we proposed in Eq. (4.1). If a player k makes a deviation
from x = (xk,x−k) to x′ = (x′k,x−k), we have:
Φ(xk,x−k)− Φ(x′k,x−k)
=
∑
i∈P
W (i)NW (i)
∑
j∈N(i)
wij(ui(xk,x−k)− ui(x′k,x−k))
=
∑
i∈P
W (i)
∑
j∈N(i)
W (j)(ui(x
′
k,x−k)− ui(x′k,x−k))
Notice that only k’s neighbors are affected, so
Φ(xk,x−k)− Φ(x′k,x−k)
=
∑
i∈P
W (i)
∑
j∈N(i)
W (j)(ui(x
′
k,x−k)− ui(x′k,x−k))
=W (k)
∑
j∈N(k)
W (j)(uk(xk,x−k)− uk(x′k,x−k)) +
∑
j∈N(k)
W (j)W (k)(uj(x
′
k,x−k)− uj(x′k,x−k))
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Let ujk be the payoff j receives from k in x, and u
′
jk is the payoff j receives from k in x
′.
Recall that utility function is symmetric, we have:
Φ(xk,x−k)− Φ(x′k,x−k)
=W (k)
∑
j∈N(k)
W (j)(ujk − u′jk) +
∑
j∈N(k)
W (j)W (k)(ukj − u′kj)
=W (k)
∑
j∈N(k)
W (j)(ujk − u′jk) +
∑
j∈N(k)
W (j)W (k)(ujk − u′jk)
=2W (k)
∑
j∈N(k)
W (j)(ujk − u′jk)
=2W (k)NW (k)
∑
j∈N(k)
wkj(ujk − u′jk)
=2W (k)NW (k)(uk(xk,x−k)− uk(x′k,x−k))
The difference of potential value after the move of a player k is the difference of k’s
utility-scale by a constant. This proves that the game is a weighted potential game and
Nash equilibrium always exists [18].
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Appendix B
PROOF FOR PRICE OF
STABILITY
In this section, we assume that the game adopts global ranking weighting system and all
players are using quadratic utility function. Because the utility functions are symmetric for
all players, the game is a potential game.
We first analyze the solution for the global convex program and local convex program
using lagrangian multiplier and KKT conditions. We then analyze games with players using
aggressive best-response and with players using conservative best-response. Our goal is to
prove that given the solution for the global convex program, we can construct the solution
profile that maximizes the social welfare value and also satisfy the constraints for the local
convex program.
B.1 Solution for Global Convex Program
We first compute the lagrangian of the global convex program:
LG(~f, ~f ∗, ~λG, ~µG, ~ηG) =FG(~f) +
∑
i∈P
∑
j∈N+(i)
λGij(f
∗
ij − fij) +
∑
i∈P
∑
j∈N+(i)
µGij(f
∗
ij − f ∗ji)
+
∑
i∈P
ηGi (
∑
j∈N+(i)
fij − β)
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By setting ∇FG(~f) = 0, we have:
∇FG(~f) =
(
2wijf
∗
ij − wijβ
)
fˆ ∗ij
where fˆ ∗ij is the unit vector. The first-order condition for the global convex program is:
∂L
∂f ∗ij
= 2wijf
∗
ij − wijβ + λGij + µGij − µGji = 0 (B.1)
∂L
∂fij
= −λGij + ηGi = 0 (B.2)
λGij(f
∗
ij − fij) = 0 (B.3)
So the solution (~fOPT , ~f ∗,OPT ) for the global convex program must satisfies:
f ∗,OPTij =
β
2
− η
G
i + µ
G
ij − µGji
2wij
(B.4)
ηGi (f
∗,OPT
ij − fOPTij ) = 0 (B.5)
We can now examine one feasibility constraints that will help use simplify the expression
for ~f ∗,OPT . Because f ∗,OPTij = f
∗,OPT
ji , we have:
f ∗,OPTij = f
∗,OPT
ji (B.6)
⇒η
G
i + µ
G
ij − µGji
wij
=
ηGj + µ
G
ji − µGij
wji
(B.7)
⇒wji(ηGi + µGij − µGji) = wij(ηGj + µGji − µGij) (B.8)
⇒(wij + wji)(µij − µji) = wijηGj − wjiηGi
⇒µij − µji = wij
wij + wji
ηGj −
wji
wij + wji
ηGi (B.9)
Put this back to f ∗,OPTij , we have
f ∗,OPTij =
β
2
− η
G
i + η
G
j
2(wij + wji)
(B.10)
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The effective frequency is characterized by the sum of two parameters ηGi and η
G
j .
Because the only constraint for ~fOPT is
∑
j∈N(i)
fOPTij = β
the game can have many optimal solutions. This is due to the coordination we choose. Be-
cause we take minimization of proposals, if one player has slack frequency after coordination,
she cannot improve her utility no matter where she spends her slack frequency.
In order to construct the solution profile that is a Nash equilibrium, we have to specify
fOPTij for all edges (i, j). For the conservative one, we have
fOPTij = f
∗,OPT
ij (conservative case)
Then the solution profile is guaranteed to be a Nash equilibrium. This is because there
is no extra frequency on any edge, and no player can deviate from this solution. So we have
the following claim
Claim 1 (Optimal Solution in Conservative Best-Response) Given the optimal so-
lution, construct a solution profile based on Eq. (conservative case). The solution profile is
a Nash equilibrium
The case for aggressive best-response is more complicated, we redistribute fii to every
edge (i, j).
Let
δij = wij
β − ∑
j∈N(i)
f ∗,OPTij

We define ~fOPT as follows:
fOPTij = f
∗,OPT
ij + δij (B.11)
We have the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Given the optimal solution for global convex program, and given the solution
profile constructed by redistribute fii in the way we just discussed. If a player i has f
OPT
ij >
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f ∗,OPTij in this solution profile for some j, then for all k ∈ N(i), fOPTik > f ∗,OPTik . If fOPTij >
f ∗,OPTij
Proof: By construction, if δij > 0 for some j, then δij > 0 for all j ∈ N(i).
We construct a solution profile ~fOPT that maximizes the social welfare value in this
section. We have the following claim:
Claim 2 (Optimal Solution in Aggressive Best-response) ~fOPT is a Nash equilibrium
for the game using aggressive best-response.
To prove the claim, we have to examine the local convex program. We analyze the
behavior of ~fOPT in the local convex program and show that it is a Nash equilibrium.
B.2 Solution for Local Convex Program
We now examine the local convex program for a player i, with the help of lagrangian, a
solution of local convex program fLij must satisfy KKT conditions:
2wijfij − wijβ + λLj + ηL = 0 (B.12)
λLj (fij − fji) = 0 (B.13)
We want to put in our solution for global convex program, which are:
f ∗,OPTij =
β
2
− η
G
i + η
G
j
2(wij + wji)
(B.14)
fOPTij = f
∗,OPT
ij + δi (B.15)
Let fLij = f
OPT
ij , with some work, we can get:
λLj + η
L =
wij
wij + wji
(ηGi + η
G
j ) (B.16)
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I now claim the solution for the local convex program is:
fLij =
β
2
− λ
L
j + η
L
2wij
(B.17)
where  λ
L
j =
wij
wij+wji
ηGj
ηL =
wij
wij+wji
ηGi
(B.18)
By construction, this solution already satisfies Eq. (B.12). We want to show that it
satisfies Eq. (B.13)
Recall that for a player i, and the solution ~f ∗,OPT , if i has an excess on one edge (i, j), it
will have excess on every edge (i, k) ∀k ∈ N(i). We have to examine two cases:
• i has an extra frequency on every edge.
• i has no extra frequency on any edge.
For the first case, because i is already at the maximum on every edge, if i moves some
frequency from a set of players K = {k1, k2, · · · , kl} and send to a set of other players
J = {j1, j − 2, · · · , jm}. Then i cannot increase its utility because of i already at the
maximum for the player in J . On the other hand, if i decrease interaction with those players
in K, it may even decrease its own utility because effective frequency will reduce. Therefore,
the solution profile also satisfies i’s local convex program. So i will not move.
For the second case, there are two types of neighbors: those neighbors who have excess,
and those neighbors who have no extra frequency. For those neighbors who have no extra
frequency, we have fij = fji, so Eq. (B.13) is satisfied.
For those neighbors who have excess, let j be one of these neighbors, its clear that
fOPTji > f
OPT
ij . Based on Eq. (B.5), we know thatη
G
j = 0. Based on Eq. (B.18), we have
λLj =
wij
wij + wji
ηGj = 0
So we also satisfy Eq. (B.13) here. So we prove the claim Claim 2.
Based on Claim 1 and Claim 2, we prove Theorem 2.
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